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Abstract: In the historiography of the Dutch Revolt and the Eighty Years War, scholars have focused 
principally on the growing differences between the Habsburg Netherlands and the Dutch Republic. In 
order to explain the eventual separation of the ‘two’ Netherlands, it has been established that the 
political culture of  both countries increasingly grew apart and so prevented reunification. Still, this 
did not mean that the diplomatic vocabulary of these states no longer contained any similarities. 
Throughout the Eighty Years War both governments relied on analogous notions of tradition, custom 
and common practice to legitimize their point of view. Such notions, together with their negative 
counterpart of innovation, were enshrined in a juridical language that also offered a point of 
convergence. In turn, these shared claims to history provided a common repertoire that diplomats from 
both sides deployed in their arguments. As such, benchmarking the past offered a communal 
framework from which to start and maintain conversation between the separated Netherlands. 
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When trying to explain the current-day separation between Belgium and the Netherlands, one 
can hardly understate the importance of the Dutch Revolt and the Eighty Years War (ca. 
1568-1648). As the subject of continuous evaluation, analysis, and re-evaluation, historians 
have increasingly gained a better understanding of this period of tremendous upheaval. The 
studies of the last decades have provided us with a clearer view of the motives behind the 
initial uprising against King Philip II, its features as a civil and religious conflict, the character 
of the subsequent war between the Spanish-Habsburgs and the Dutch Estates-General, and the 
causes of the slow but steady separation of the ‘loyal’ Habsburg Netherlands and the 
‘rebellious’ Dutch Republic.1 Due to the fact that ultimately no initiative for reunification 
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(peaceful or otherwise) proved successful, scholars have strongly highlighted the 
differentiation in religious and political thinking between the two halves of the Netherlands, 
seeing them as causes for the waning unity of the former Seventeen Provinces.
2
  
 However, in focussing on the division which separated them, far fewer questions 
have been asked about any potential communalities that remained in the political cultures of 
these two early modern states. This article will therefore discuss one type of common ground 
that still existed between the Habsburg Netherlands and the Dutch Republic, namely the 
importance of a shared and idealized past.
3
 Notions of tradition, custom and common practice 
permeated the discussions between the belligerent parties of the Eighty Years War, placing 
their (perceived) history on a pedestal from which both sides claimed to be able to distinguish 
the just from the unjust, the legitimate from the illegitimate. Legal experts, whom often 
enough conducted the actual bilateral negotiations, further fused such arguments with their 
own juridical discourse, creating a shared vocabulary that was sufficiently familiar to both 
sides to allow the initiation of debate. The connotations attached to this juridicized past turned 
out to be a solid diplomatic ‘baseline’, which one the one hand could be exploited to 
undermine the opponent’s political claims but on the other shows that enough common 
ground remained to build some initial bridges.
4
   
 The present analysis will therefore focus on the arguments voiced by active political 
participants rather than rely on the political ideas enshrined in learned treatises or popular 
pamphlets.
5
 The text starts by highlighting how the historiographical attention to the 
differences between the Netherlands created the idea of two radically opposed political 
systems, even though both of these polities in fact still used the same model to describe their 
own style of government. Subsequently, the argument will be presented that this model 
functioned as a benchmark because it derived its legitimacy from a shared past, and that the 
use of such arguments was reinforced by the contending party’s reliance upon a legal 
language that also contained many shared features. Finally, and moving to a concrete 
example, the last part of the article will demonstrate how even after the end of the War this 
use of history still influenced the diplomatic deliberations about the Dutch taxation of villages 
near Antwerp.
6
 
 However, before starting these discussions a further remark about terminology needs 
to be made. It is important to note that this article takes a broad view on the notion of ‘the 
past’, bringing together categories that others might prefer to treat separately. Although 
specialized studies have distinguished between the exact meanings of tradition, custom and 
common practice, at their core all of these concepts rely on (the perception of) preceding 
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events. In order to avoid getting entangled in intricate conceptual discussions, this analysis 
consciously includes all sorts of references to such preceding events, be they of recent or 
more ancient nature. In this sense the goal is not so much to question existing categorizations 
about the use of the past, nor to link them with broader debates about memory, history and 
customary law, but rather to show how and why claims to time-honoured practices were used 
to support political debates related to the Eighty Years War.
7
 
 
The general history of the Eighty Years War: a focus on difference 
 
That the separation of the Dutch Republic and the Habsburg Netherlands has been a central 
topic in Low Countries historiography can be judged by the vast amount of writings on this 
topic. Difference and division have been keywords in much of this research. The nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century historiography of both Belgium and the Netherlands highlighted 
the importance of the Revolt for the national development of their respective states. On the 
Dutch side historians such as Guillame Groen van Prinsterer, Johannes van Vloten, and 
Robert Fruin saw the Revolt as a struggle for national freedom against the oppression of the 
Spanish King, with religious tolerance becoming increasingly identified with a key aspect of 
the Dutch national identity.
8
 In Belgium it were authors like Henri Moke, Theodore Juste, and 
Henri Pirenne who tried to give the Belgian nation a sound historical perspective, whereby the 
Eighty Years War was a deplorable episode during which the devastated ‘Belgian’ provinces 
continued to groan under a Spanish yoke.
9
 Despite growing criticism that modern-day 
Belgium and the Netherlands were not the inevitable outcome of the events of the sixteenth 
century, these national colourings of the separation remained dominant for a long time. 
 From the second half of the twentieth century the finalistic acceptance of the division 
of the Netherlands was however abandoned for a more flexible interpretation of the Eighty 
Years War. Consulting more sources from local and Spanish archives, historians transformed 
the black-and-white of oppression/extremism vs. liberty/toleration into a more appropriate 
grey.
10
 This research highlighted that the shared culture of the Low Countries had created a 
perception of unity between the different provinces, a sentiment which ensured that at least 
until 1600 serious calls for reunification were made.
11
 The first decades of the Revolt were 
therefore increasingly described as a civil war, with an important role played by the so-called 
‘middle-groups’ who tried to find a balance between the political and religious extremes as 
well as for noble elites that aimed at peace and reconciliation between al parties.
12
 But despite 
nuancing the earlier writing on the Eighty Years War historians continued to focus on the 
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eventual separation and the resulting differences between both states. Even though they 
recognised that the independence of the Dutch Republic need not have been inevitable sensu 
stricto, the fact that the division in the long run proved insurmountable warranted the 
continued investigation into its nature.  
 As Henk van Nierop made clear in 1995, these inquiries developed along three 
distinct lines. The economic structure and social stratification of the Low Countries were 
identified as one specific cause for the Revolt, but so was the religious schism following the 
Reformation and the increasing state formation and centralization of the Habsburgs in a 
highly urbanized landscape.
13
 In reality these three motives all interacted, making it difficult 
to pinpoint one central catalyst for the separation. Still, the disputes that feature most 
prominently in historiography are those about the relationship between Protestantism and 
Catholicism and about the functioning of the government in the Netherlands.
14
 Their 
prominence is not without reason: even as late as 1631 Pieter Roose, Councilor of the Consejo 
de Flandes in Madrid, found it necessary to stress that religion and sovereignty were precisely 
the two principal reasons to continue the fight.
15
 As a native of the Low Countries Roose 
might have had less concern for the overall economic interests of the Spanish-Habsburg 
monarchy, but his statement nevertheless clarifies the central role that these problems 
assumed in the perduration of the conflict.
16
  
 It is no coincidence that Roose mentioned religion and government in the same 
breath. In the minds of the key players both topics could hardly be separated, implying that 
from the very beginning of the Revolt faith and politics had become highly entwined. The 
way in which King Philip II used his royal authority to press for the severe persecution of the 
religiously reformed clashed with the more moderate, consensual policies preferred in the 
Netherlands. As neither the King nor the local elites were willing to back down, the tensions 
over the persecutions became fused with questions about how and by whom political power 
should be exercised. This in turn transformed the religious matter into a debate over the 
‘constitutional’ rights of King and his subjects.17 Eventually the intractability of these 
problems provoked the Abjuration of Spanish-Habsburg rule by the States-General in 1581, 
demonstrating how deep the political rift between the crown and the opposition had become.
18
  
 
The political history of the Eighty Years War: the divergence of dominium  
 
At first sight these problems indeed suggest a radical divergence between the two contesting 
sides. In the gradually worsening debate about legitimate government, historians have 
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consequentially identified three opposed political systems. The first model, described by 
Helmut Koenigsberger with the phrase dominium politicum et regale, struck a balance 
between the other two systems, namely law-making through royal authority (dominium 
regale) and the necessary approval of such laws by the people (dominium politicum).
19
 This 
first constellation supposedly formed the default political situation Philip II inherited in the 
Netherlands, a view which in part rested on the contemporary interpretation of Charles V’s 
rule as a golden age.
20
 In practice, the presumed cooperation between ruler and subjects was 
principally characterized through the interaction between the Prince and the parliamentary 
bodies of the Estates (representing the clergy, nobility and urban patriciate).
21
 Even though 
the Habsburg overlord nominally possessed the highest authority in the Seventeen Provinces, 
the provincial Estates and the overarching Estates-general retained the power to grant taxes 
and expected to be consulted on crucial policy decisions. Unsurprisingly, they often acted as a 
serious restraint on the implementation of royal initiatives.
22
 
 Although this system was never free from (violent) tension, it continued to function 
until the mid-sixteenth century.
23
 However, once King Philip II started his reign over the Low 
Countries his style of government increasingly tended towards the dominium regale. Philip, 
who had been raised in Spain and continued to reside in the Iberian peninsula save for a brief 
stay in the Netherlands between 1555 and 1559, found it difficult to manage the intricate 
negotiations with the Estates. The first assembly of the Estates-General during his rule lasted 
from 1557 to 1559 and resulted in a more or less permanent royal veto against further 
convocations.
24
 Backed by the theorists of the School of Salamanca the King saw his 
authority as absolute, upsetting the Estates and the nobility by deciding singlehandedly on key 
matters. This increasingly autocratic style of governing eventually became a major cause of 
the Dutch Revolt, provoking the lasting myth of ‘Spanish oppression’ in the Netherlands.25 
 Conversely, in reaction to the King’s strong-handed rule the processes of Revolt and 
War set the nascent Dutch Republic on a course towards the dominium politicum. From 1572 
onwards the provincial Estates of Holland and Zeeland had become practically self-
governing, a position from which they continued to press for greater toleration of the 
religiously Reformed and for more autonomy for the Estates-General. Granting these 
demands was out of the question for the King and his Governors-General in Brussels, but as 
the Habsburg’s financial situation worsened the Monarchy’s grip on events started to slip. In 
1576 the Estates of Brabant (illegally) called for a convocation of the Estates-General, who 
without royal sanction concluded a peace with Holland and Zeeland (the Pacification of 
Ghent, 8 November 1576). Although this peace did not last, the Estates-General continued to 
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play a leading role in the conflict. On 26 July 1581 the Assembly renounced the King’s rule 
and, following failed attempts to offer the highest authority to the Duke of Anjou, William of 
Orange and the Earl of Leicester, assumed leadership over the secessionist federation known 
as the Dutch Republic of the United Provinces.
26
  
 As many historians have highlighted, these evolutions set the two Netherlands on a 
separate course, even though this was not explicitly recognized at the time. The system 
Koenigsberger identified as dominium politicum proved remarkably resilient in the Dutch 
Republic, as did strong royal rule in the remaining obedient provinces. At first sight these 
models were also diametrically opposed. According to the Dutch government the Habsburgs 
had completely oppressed the parliamentary institutions in the Netherlands, whereas 
Habsburg supporters accused the Republic of abandoning the traditional monarchical 
structures. Because neither the Estates-General nor the King were able to reconquer the whole 
of the Netherlands, the former Seventeen Provinces were de facto, and with the Treaty of 
Munster of 1648 de jure, divided into two different political structures..  
 
The ‘long’ and powerful traditions of the Low Countries 
 
The above arguments stress that the Eighty Years War created a radical political watershed 
between both parts of the Netherlands. One side supposedly loyal and royal, the other 
rebellious and republican, with no common ground remaining to start a meaningful 
conversation. But the question needs to be asked if there effectively remained no common 
features that could be exploited, and whether or not meaningful political debate was therefore 
truly impossible. Both during and after the conflict both sides continued to talk, and even 
though the failure of most of these conversations attest to the strength of the political and 
religious division, some form of shared vocabulary must have aided their initiation. To use a 
contemporary analogy, even North and South Korea from time to time manage to discuss their 
issues, meaning that both countries must have found a workable diplomatic discourse that 
goes beyond the mere shouting of ‘communist’ or ‘capitalist’ dogma’s. More or less the same 
must have applied to the Eighty Years War, meaning that we can try to determine on which 
type of arguments such functional political discourses rested. 
 In this respect, exactly the growing tensions between strong royal rule and the power 
of the Estates provides a first clue to what supported the diplomacy between the Habsburgs 
and the Dutch Republic. Their growing apart did not preclude both governments from 
referencing the same political ideal, namely that which Koenigsberger dubbed dominium 
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politicum et regale. In accusing the enemy of violating this system, each side simultaneously 
contended that their own form of politics did correspond to the ideal of cooperation between 
Prince and subject. Despite their differences in interpretation, nominally both The Hague and 
Madrid/Brussels still referred to this style of government as the only acceptable type of rule, 
turning it into a clear yardstick during several rounds of negotiations.
27
 So although the 
United Provinces and the Habsburg Netherlands in practice no longer shared the same 
political system, some ideals clearly retained their attraction for both. 
 The question then rises from where such standards derived their validity and how 
their use impacted upon the bilateral relations between both states. In the case of the 
dominium politicum et regale, it was not necessarily the model’s specific content that 
permitted it to function as a political benchmark. Although the respective merits of monarchy, 
aristocracy, democracy and the constitutio mixta were certainly topics for debate, the practical 
political attraction of cooperation between King and Estates largely relied on the fact that it 
supposedly represented the situation before the Revolt; the way in which the government of 
the Netherlands presumably had been organised for centuries. Even though this might have 
been a myth as well, it was believed to be the traditional type of politics and therefore an ideal 
that could not easily be abandoned (which was of course exactly what each side accused the 
other of doing).  
 This line of reasoning was certainly not something exceptional. The early modern 
period was beset by debates about tradition and continuity. A recent project of Judith 
Pollmann highlighted the importance of history and memory for the formation of cultural 
identities ánd for the achievement of political aspirations, whereas Philippe Guignet 
demonstrated how the past retained this role well into the eighteenth century.
28
 The impact of 
such a ‘historicized’ political language can easily be understood by referring to the well-
known ‘privileges’ of the Low Countries. In essence these were different types of rights that 
derived their authority from a supposed origin in an older, similarly idealized politico-legal 
system. This ‘ancient’ origin granted the privileges such legitimacy that the political culture 
of the Netherlands was highly conditioned by the pride and belief bestowed upon such rights, 
which explains why some scholars have described them as an early form of constitution..
29
 In 
fact, one argument used during the Dutch Revolt specifically related to the misuse of the 
privileges, as many of the Habsburg enemies used them to argue  that the King’s fiscal and 
religious policies had violated the rights of his subjects.
30
 Following this accusation, and 
based on a similarly ‘age-old’ right to resist tyranny, the existence of the Dutch Republic was 
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increasingly legitimated by referring to the oppression of the Dutch privileges and the 
Habsburg oppression of the ‘old liberty’ of the provinces.31 
 As the United Provinces claimed legitimacy through tradition, at the same time respect 
for supposedly ancient rights was also no trivial matter in the Habsburg Netherlands. This is 
clarified by the earlier mentioned councilor Peter Roose, who in a long memorial addressed to 
the Consejo de Estado of Philip IV showed himself a fierce opponent of the provincial Estates 
and a supporter of strong royal authority. Still, even he advised the King not to act against the 
privileges:  
 
But his Majesty will also be served by considering the danger that rests in altering the Joyous 
Entries or the promises since time immemorial sworn by his predecessors at their 
inauguration, and even to speak himself or let the ministers speak about them, because it is 
important for princes to reign by such conditions, and to live by the example of those who 
possess a rented house, contenting themselves with the commodities it has.
32
 
 
For Roose respect for the privileges of the Estates only served to help re-establish the power 
of the ruler.
33
 In his view it was not only the King’s subjects who held such rights, because 
also the monarch could rely on powers that derived from the idealized and supposedly 
unchangeable political system of dominium politicum et regale. Reflecting the wider struggle 
of the Eighty Years War, within the Habsburg Netherlands two sorts of established rights thus 
vied for political dominance: the privileges of the subjects versus the sovereign rights of the 
King, both of which claimed legitimacy by adhering to perceived governmental tradition. 
In this political framework, notions of tradition, custom and common practice were 
often explicitly connected to their direct opposite: innovation.
34
 It is no coincidence that in the 
above statement Roose specifically mentions that the risk lay in altering the Joyous Entry. As 
was pointed out by René Vermeir, Philip IV’s subjects in the Low Countries were faithful to 
the dynasty but under no circumstances appreciated the introduction of so-called ‘novelties’.35 
New laws, taxes or any other sorts of innovation would only be consented to if they were 
proposed and executed in conformity to the privileges (or at least were perceived as such). In 
his memorial Roose applied the same reasoning. He again advised Philip IV to ‘religiously 
guard’ the exact contents of the Joyous Entries, as the sovereign should never allow their 
adaption or an interpretation that was prejudicial to His prerogatives. The ‘derecho comun’ 
should never be altered, either in support of the Estates or in favour of the King.
36
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Legal culture and its jurists as a bridging agents 
 
In both parts of the Netherlands the past was thus a crucial part of political reasoning. But as 
the last comment from Roose makes clear, connotations of tradition and innovation were also 
often framed in the context of ‘derecho’ or law. The Low Countries as a whole possessed a 
vibrant legal culture, which expressed itself in an active judicial system and a (relatively) 
widespread knowledge of legal jargon and procedure. The unification of the Seventeen 
Provinces under the Burgundian dynasty and Emperor Charles V had led to the establishment 
of several provincial courts and to increased centralization through the overarching Collateral 
Councils. In this densely institutionalized environment the legal system dealt with all types of 
disputes, rendering it a highly visible and (again relatively) accessible tool for different social 
groups.
37
 It is no surprise then that law was another aspect of political life in the Netherlands 
that featured prominently during the Eighty Years War. For example, even during the earliest 
phases of its existence the young the Republic considered the maintenance of a functioning 
judicial system of primary importance.
38
  
Staying with the example of Peter Roose, such legal prominence was of direct 
consequence for actual policy. In 1632 the government in Madrid appointed Roose as 
president of both the Privy Council and the Council of State in Brussels, making him the 
actual right hand of the Governor-General there.
39
 Being a jurist with a talent for justifying 
Habsburg rule, he possessed two crucial advantages over his competitors:
40
 on the one hand 
he could assist the Governor-General in navigating the legal maze that formed part of daily 
governance in the Netherlands, on the other his above-cited memorials proved that he was 
well-acquainted with the discussions over privileges and sovereignty that formed such a big 
part of the Eighty Years War. This meant that he could also deploy his legal knowledge when 
navigating Habsburgs interests through the international arena, where legitimizing Habsburg 
rule vis-à-vis the newly created Dutch Republic was of crucial importance.
41
  
Roose’s promotion to the highest realms of politics was no exception. As part of a 
trend dating back to earlier centuries, jurists increasingly became the primary servants of the 
state, both in the Habsburg Netherlands and the Dutch Republic.
42
 But they also left their 
mark as actors in the diplomacy of the Eighty Years War. During the negotiations for the 
Twelve Years Truce of 1609 the leading diplomats, Pierre Jeannin, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt 
and Jean Richardot, could all rely on a university training in Roman Law.
43
 In 1632, the 
Habsburg delegation that was sent to Maastricht to conduct peace negotiations with the 
United Provinces consisted of two clergymen, three noblemen, and four specialized jurists.
44
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At the 1648 Münster conference, both parties likewise relied on the presence of legal experts. 
One of the principal Habsburg representatives was Anthoine Brun, previously president of the 
Burgundian Parliament in Dôle, who was specifically tasked with exploiting the linguistic and 
cultural similarities that existed between the two Netherlands.
45
 Similarly, the de facto head of 
the Dutch delegation was Leiden-trained jurist Adriaan Pauw.
46
  
The importance of legal expertise for bilateral debate was further underscored once the 
Treaty of Münster was concluded. Anthoine Brun was made ambassador in The Hague 
following the negotiations and as such became the first and foremost channel of 
communication between the Habsburgs and the Estates-General. Of even greater significance 
was the creation of a special court of arbitration in 1653, where sixteen jurists (eight from 
each side) would decide all unresolved problems related to the Peace. Even though this 
Chambre Mi-Partie was in essence an institution without precedent and thus an innovation, 
the practice of arbitration itself was well-established in the Netherlands. Moreover, the Court 
included some of the most experienced legal experts of the period and followed a procedure 
similar to that of the older legal councils in the Low Countries.
47
 These aspects granted the 
Chambre sufficient authority to attract a lot of cases, even though its verdicts were often 
rebuked with – not surprisingly – arguments based on the ancient privileges of the litigants.48 
Despite this opposition, the fact that the Chambre Mi-Partie could operate across two political 
systems is a remarkable achievement, especially given the immense post-war tensions within 
which the Court functioned.  
One reason why its deliberations managed to proceed had to do with the reliance of its 
judges upon a shared juridical language, one which had earlier aided the negotiations for the 
Twelve Years’ Truce and the Treaty of Munster. The centralization policies of the 
Burgundian and Habsburg dynasties, including the founding of the university of Louvain in 
1425, had implied that the top-ranking jurists of the Netherlands had for a long time been 
trained in the same legal mold and had served in the same legal institutions.
49
 Even though the 
Dutch Revolt severed many direct linkages – e.g. by the creation of the Dutch university of 
Leiden in 1575, which allowed the Dutch Republic to recruit and train its own legal 
professionals – decades of comparable legal practice could not be erased on a whim.50 Older, 
shared laws were simply maintained in the Dutch Republic, and sometimes new Habsburg 
regulations were quietly implemented in order to guarantee continuity. A clear example is the 
decision of the Estates-General to adopt the 1604 Habsburg Albertine (a piece of procedural 
legislation issued by Archdukes Albert and Isabella) into the regulations of their own Council 
of Brabant.
51
 Even though both states steadily developed a legal culture of their own, the 
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jurists involved in the diplomatic debates of the War could none the less rely upon ideas, 
concepts, and procedures that the past had made familiar to both sides.
52
  
 
Law, custom, and common practice at work: the Habsburg charges after 1648 
 
The juridicized past thus possessed clear value as a political argument in the diplomacy of the 
Eighty Years War. In order to demonstrate how this worked in practice, the controversy over 
the Brabantine retorsions of 1649 serves as a good example. This dispute arose within one 
year of the signing of the Münster Treaty and was one of the first confrontations between the 
Habsburgs and the Dutch governments after 1648. The problems began around the 12th of 
February 1649, when the Brussels Council of State informed Governor-General Leopold-
Wilhelm that in the previous few months Dutch officials had committed several infractions 
against the Peace. One of the most serious violations was the Dutch use of military means to 
collect so-called retorsionary money in towns along the border near Antwerp.
53
 According to 
the Brussels councilors these actions  
 
not only shocked the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the King, who does not permit on his 
lands any execution or force of neighboring provinces, but they [the United Provinces] could 
also not be excused of a notorious infraction of the Peace Treaty.
54
  
 
Although the Council of State advised the Governor-General to retaliate, Leopold-Wilhelm 
was under strict instructions from Madrid to maintain the Peace. Wishing to avoid an 
escalation, he eventually took the decision to have the renowned Louvain jurist Petrus 
Stockmans discuss the matter with the Dutch government in The Hague.
55
 Stockmans, who 
was at the time temporary representative of the Governor-General in the United Provinces 
(waiting to be relieved by Ambassador Brun), would be assisted by pensionary Jacques 
Edelheer from the city of Antwerp.
56
  
 Both these envoys perfectly correspond to the image of the domestically trained, 
politically weathered jurist involved in international diplomacy. Jacques Edelheer (1597-
1655)
57
 graduated in 1617 from the faculty of Law in Louvain and only seven years later 
became pensionary of Antwerp. Involved as he was in the administration of the most 
important border town of the Habsburg Netherlands, Edelheer was well-acquainted with the 
nature of cross-border politics with the Dutch Republic. Moreover, he had already acted as 
one of the Habsburg representatives during the failed peace negotiations of 1632.
58
 Petrus 
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(Pieter) Stockmans (1608-1671) also studied in Louvain and became doctor iuris in 1631. 
Two years later he was appointed as Regius professor at the same university. In 1643 he 
abandoned this post in favour of a seat on the Council of Brabant, eventually becoming a 
member of the Privy Council in 1664. Like Roose, Stockmans’ writings defended both royal 
authority ánd the privileges even though he was first and foremost a trusted servant of the 
Habsburg dynasty.
59
 His Tractatus de jure devolutionis (1667) for example contained a strong 
defence of the Spanish-Habsburg rights against the French aspirations expressed during the 
1667-1668 Devolution Crisis, attesting to his continuous attempts to create a legal framework 
for Habsburg rule.
60
 
Together, these two personalities presented the Estates-General with a highly juridical 
refutation of the Dutch retorsions near Antwerp. After stating the wish of the Habsburg 
subjects involved that the matter should be arranged according to righteousness and justice, 
Stockmans opened with the following argument: 
 
As it is nothing more than notorious that all realms, provinces and states are separated from 
each other by their limits and boundaries, outside which a particular state is not allowed to 
perform any act of high jurisdiction on the other state, […] as being contrary to the law of 
nations and the fundamental laws of the foresaid peace.
61
 
 
Although it is in itself remarkable that Stockmans and Edelheer explicitly grounded their 
reasoning in International Law (hereafter referred to as ius gentium),
62
 it is even more 
significant that they saw this type of law as something which was well-known by all the 
parties involved. Key to their subsequent arguments were the customs and common practices 
shared by both sides during the preceding war. The Louvain-trained jurists pinpointed their 
reasoning on the fact that both sides had ‘always’ respected the idea that retorsions had been a 
specific type of violence, namely a reprisal for an earlier suffered wrongdoing. As the Treaty 
of Munster had put an end to all such wrongdoings the Dutch could not conduct retorsionary 
acts during peacetime, meaning that the recent collection of money could not be anything less 
than a breach of past practice and a clear act of hostility.  
A letter from the Habsburg Council of State to the Estates-General proves that this was 
a well-planned strategy. The Brussels Council confirmed Stockmans’ argument by stating that 
the use of retorsions in this case was ‘directly contrary […] to the law of nations and common 
practice of al nations’.63 In making the connection between the supposedly common practices 
of the ius gentium and their own particular interpretation of what a lawful retorsion was, the 
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Habsburg side tried to set the tone for all future discussions about the recent violence. In an 
echo of the application of the ‘ancient’ dominium politicum et regale, the shared customs of 
the Law of Nations - as ancient, recent, or unilaterally constructed as these actually might 
have been – functioned as benchmarks against which the Dutch conduct could be judged. The 
Estates-General were thus not only faced with the charge that they had broken the clauses of 
the Munster Peace Treaty (another obvious point of reference), but also that they had also 
sinned against an established standard that was widely known and accepted.  
 
The defence of United Provinces: Habsburg innovations as a precedent 
 
Contrary to what might be expected from a state that thoroughly distrusted royal arguments, 
in their response of the 29th April 1649 the Estates-General chose to follow the frame of 
reasoning the Habsburgs had imposed. They tried to prove that the United Provinces had ‘in 
no part violated the sovereignty of the most highly thought lord King of Spain or are guilty of 
the least procedures contrary to the law of nations or also against the articles of the concluded 
peace’.64 Despite their disadvantage in accepting the Habsburg frame of reference, the Dutch 
Republic successfully mounted a vigorous defence, appealing to precisely the same notions of 
international custom that Stockmans had used against them. The Estates-General refused to be 
pressed into a purely defensive position and with the very first point of their rebuttal turned 
the tables on the Habsburg negotiators. Ingeniously deploying the argument of innovation,
65
 
they claimed that the Habsburgs had themselves broken with customary practice by retaining 
sovereignty over the countryside surrounding the Brabantine city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch (called 
Meierij) after the Dutch had captured the city in 1629: 
  
The Spanish side in an outrageous way and with an unprecedented claim had most strongly 
objected to this [the transfer of sovereignty over the Meierij to the Republic], using as pretext 
that the sovereignty of the countryside remained with the King of Spain and did not follow the 
[capture] of the capital under which it resided, against the instance always used by both sides 
during the war at the capture of Antwerp and all other cities, and under this pretence and 
pretext maintain and kept extorting the Meierij of ‘s-Hertogenbosch.66 
 
This action had intensely grieved the Estates-General because it indeed departed from what 
had been customary behaviour throughout the War.
67
 As their representatives pointed out, in 
1628 the then Governess-General, Archduchess Isabella, had herself issued a declaration in 
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which she confirmed that, following a successful city siege, the surrounding countryside must 
also switch sides.
68
 So from the Dutch perspective it was the Habsburgs who in 1629 had 
introduced the first innovation, and in an especially hypocritical way. 
 Having placed Stockmans and Edelheer in an awkward position, the Estates-General 
subsequently argued that their own retorsionary actions were perfectly legal. According to 
them retorsions were always caused by a preceding extortion, and the same applied here. The 
continued Habsburg claims of sovereignty over the Meierij and the associated tax levies had 
been just such an extorsion, implying that the extraction of money from the Antwerp 
countryside was an acceptable retorsion on the part of the United Provinces. The violence 
wrought by the Dutch collectors had been announced beforehand and was no more extreme 
than what had been customary during the War. While for the Estates-General the 1629 
Habsburg extorsions/innovations in the Meierij represented the cause, the 1648-1649 
retorsions/customary acts near Antwerp merely the lawful consequence. Straining this line of 
reasoning to the limit, the Estates-General declared that if the Habsburgs wished to respect the 
just continuation of affairs they should not complain about these perfectly customary actions, 
but instead ensure that their subjects paid the required sums to the Republic.
69
  
 The above arguments clarify that despite the initial Habsburg framing of the problem 
the Dutch Republic had no problem in deploying arguments of custom and common practice 
of its own. Attesting to the sophistication such reasoning could achieve, there is even a less 
overt implication arising from the statements of the Estates-General. The Dutch defence 
contained an obscured but nevertheless clear warning for Stockmans and Edelheer. From the 
Dutch position, the Habsburg violation of the customary practices of war had created a 
precedent for the moderation of all sorts of international ‘norms’. If in 1629 the Spanish 
monarch had faithfully observed the then-applicable traditions in respect of the transfer of 
sovereignty, no one would have doubted the validity of all other customary principles in 1649. 
But now, given the earlier Habsburg disregard for such customs, the Dutch could hardly be 
blamed if they themselves would no longer be held accountable to such principles. After all, it 
would hardly be fair if the United Provinces had to abide by the rules whilst the Habsburgs 
could initiate innovations at will.  
 This covert argument signalled to Stockmans and Edelheer that the Dutch were 
content not to rock the boat at this point, but that at any time the Estates-General might decide 
to abandon the framework of custom and common practice altogether. For now the Dutch 
Republic benefitted from employing this type of language, as it allowed them to uphold the 
image of a reliable state. However, if push came to shove the Estates-General could decide to 
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break with the arguments derived from the shared past. As the Habsburgs had been the first to 
do so, no one would blame them for doing the same. The Spanish-Habsburg negotiators were 
well aware such a move would open Pandora’s Box, as many of their claims in other parallel 
disputes relied even more on respect for common, shared, or customary rules.
70
 Although 
Stockmans and Edelheer in response again tried to convince the Estates-General of the 
illegitimacy of their retorsions, this time by using the past practices of the earlier Twelve 
Years Truce as a benchmark, the Habsburgs eventually backed down and no agreement was 
reached.
71
 In this instance, as in many other disputes during and after the Eighty Years War, 
the juridicized rhetoric of custom, common practice and tradition had allowed the initiation 
and continuation of debate, avoiding any further deterioration in the bilateral relations 
between the Habsburg Netherlands and the Dutch Republic.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The above few pages have shed light upon some functional arrangements of the diplomacy of 
the Eighty Years War. Even though the Eighty Years War had undoubtedly generated a deep 
ideological rift between the two Netherlands, one which eventually proved to be 
insurmountable, the divergence of both countries did not preclude all meaningful debate 
between them. The diplomacy between the two contending parties shows a clear baseline 
around which the otherwise strongly contrasting ideas of both governments could converge, a 
language that temporarily masked the growing differences and permitted the start of a real 
conversation. Notions of tradition, custom and common practice, all deriving their validity 
from the shared past of the Netherlands, provided arguments that were free of strong 
ideological contention and thus removed the risk of prematurely ending the deliberations. 
Aided by the presence of politically active jurists, who enveloped these connotations into a 
similarly shared legal jargon, ideas about the ‘ancient’ cooperation between king and Estates 
or the ‘common’ ius gentium proved to be a standard from which both countries could begin 
their negotiations. Being an acceptable starting point for discussion and containing concepts 
that were deemed important on both sides, benchmarking the juridicized past thus became 
crucial step for many attempts at pacification. And even though most of these debates in the 
end rendered no tangible result, the fact that certain (perceived) communalities made it 
possible to discuss rather than fight is an important addition to our understanding of why the 
peace between the Habsburg Netherlands and the Dutch Republic lasted.   
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 Additionally, this observation also serves as a reminder that the Eighty Years War 
did not result in a radical divide on all fronts. As has sometimes been observed for other great 
ruptures in history, the divergence of two formerly united entities did not always entail their 
absolute separation in all domains.
72
 In no way this article wants to argue that the similarities 
between the Habsburg Netherlands and the Dutch Republic outweighed their differences or 
that the two governments had the same perception of their joined past.
73
 But in many 
instances the separated parts of the Netherlands nevertheless found enough common ground 
to organize peaceful conversation, which in turn shows that there remained at least some 
features of similarity.
74
 Accepting that the Dutch Republic had created a new governmental 
system for itself, one which in terms of content differed greatly from the political landscape of 
the Habsburg Netherlands, should not blind historians to the fact that both states continued to 
share some aspects of the same politic-legal culture and were able to find and exploit this 
common ground when needed. 
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